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1. introduction’ 
Though the origins of anti-trust legislation, at least in the United States, 
undoubtedly lie in late nineteenth century Populist sentiments, its current 
intellectual foundations rest on modern welfare economics. These intellectual 
foundations provide more than just rhetoric, as courts have increasingly 
relied on the testimony of economists to interpret and reinterpret the 
inevitably vague language of the legislation. 
The reliance on modern welfare economics is somewhat paradoxical. For 
the assumptions underlying the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 
are peculiarly ill-suited to deal with competition in the central area to which 
anti-trust is applied - the industrial sectors of modern economies. These 
sectors are characterized by important non-convexities, which admittedly 
present inherent problems for competition. The competition that does take 
place is as likely to take the form of product and R&D competition, rather 
than price competition. Product competition plays no role in the conven- 
tional welfare paradigm, which assumes a complete set of commodities.’ And 
it is not that Arrow and Debreu simply forgot to include technical change in 
their formulations: the natural assumptions underlying the analysis of the 
production, marketing, and utilization of knowledge are basically inconsis- 
tent with those underlying the Arrow Debreu model.’ 
‘Invited paper. European Economic Association meetings, Copenhagen, August, 1987. 
Financtal support from the National Science Foundation and the Hoover Institution is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
‘The presence of non-convexittes in production is central in explaining why only a ftnite 
subset of the set of possible commodities is in fact produced, 
‘Techmcal change is characterized by non-convexities in its production [Radner and Stiglitz 
(1984)]. If technology exhibits. say, constant returns to scale at a fixed technology, when inputs 
devoted to R&D are included. it exhibits non-convexities. The value or information may increuse 
with the scale of production. While conventional theory focuses on markets for homogeneous 
commodities. each piece of new knowledge must be dinerent from previously produced 
knowledge. Knowledge has many of the properties of public goods, it being both dificult and 
undesirable to exclude. Markets for knowledge are, at best, imperfect, and, as we have argued 
OOl4-2921/88/53.50 0 1988, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland). 
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2. Contestability: The promise of a more general theory 
It is thus not surprising that so many economists, and anti-trust lawyers, 
found so attractive the suggestion, originally put forth by such Chicago 
economists as Demsetz and formalized by Grossman (1981) and Baumol, 
Panzar and Willig (1982), that even in the presence of large non-convexities, 
markets may be efftcient. Potential competition, not actual competition, was 
all that was required to ensure both efficiency and that the gains from 
efficiency would be passed along to consumers. 
There was even a suggestion that potential competition would resolve the 
problems posed by technological change. Adam Smith’s vision of the virtues 
of capitalism had as much to do with his belief in the drive for innovation 
which it provided as it did with the kinds of considerations which have been 
the focus of modern welfare economics. Schumpeter forcefully criticized the 
textbook economics of his day not only because they were misguided in their 
focus, but because their conception of modern capitalism was simply wrong. 
He argued that there would be temporary monopolies in each market. 
Competition would force such high expenditures on R&D that profits would 
be driven down to zero. To Schumpeter, this dynamic efficiency was far more 
important than the static efficiency that seemed to be the concern of other 
economists. 
If the arguments that even in the presence of non-convexities which lead to 
only one firm producing in a market potential competition ensures efficient 
outcomes were correct, and if those arguments could be extended to the 
particular kinds of non-convexities associated with technological changeP 
then we would at last have an intellectual foundation for the belief in the 
efftciency of capitalist industrial economies; anti-trust policy would, however, 
have a much more circumscribed role than depicted in the traditional 
analysis. A large market share would, for instance, not be indicative of the 
desirability of government intervention. 
3. Disappointment: The pervasiveness of inefficiencies with actual and potential 
competition 
The hope that a theory of potential competition would at last enable the 
extension of welfare economics to modern industrial economies, while it may 
have been well funded, was not well founded. 
For even by the mid-7Os, it was clear that free entry - the zero profit 
elsewhere (Dasgupta and Stiglitx (198Oa. 1908b)). product markets in which the production of 
new knowledge (R&D) is important are almost inevitably imperfectly competitive. For a more 
general discussion of these issues, see Stiglitx (1987). 
4Technological change presented further problems to the traditional paradigm than just those 
associated with non-convexities, as we suggested in the previous footnote. 
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condition - was not sufficient to ensure economic efficiency in the presence of 
non-convexities. Dixit and Stiglitz had shown that only under certain 
stringent conditions would a market achieve a constrained Pareto efficient 
outcome (where the government was precluded from providing lump sum 
subsidies to cover the fixed costs associated with the non-convexities).’ 
Indeed, while potential competition might alter behavior - firms might 
undertake greater capacity expansion, invest in more durable machines, 
engage in a host of other entry deterrence devices - welfare might not be 
increased relative to what it would have been in the absence of competition; 
a fortiori, there was no presumption that potential competition ensured any 
kind of (constrained or unconstrained) optimum. Stiglitz (1981) showed, for 
instance, that the threat of entry lead to responses by the incumbent firms 
which enable them to deter entry; thus potential entrants are no better off; 
but incumbent profits are lower. Some of the entry deterring actions could, 
at the same time, hurt consumers. For instance, a monopolist owner of a 
natural resource would raise prices (conserve on its stock of oil) to deter 
entry. 
If potential competition may, under some circumstances, be Pareto inefh- 
cient, a fortiori, there will be circumstances in which, under some less 
stringent welfare criterion, welfare would be lowered, in which though some 
gain and others lose, the gains are, in some sense, smaller than the losses. 
4. Potential and actual competition 
Just as there is no clear relationship between potential competition and 
economic welfare, the relation between potential competition and actual 
competition is also complex. It has proven useful to divide the analysis of 
market equilibrium into two stages, before the entrant enters the market, and 
after. Baumol, Panzar, and Willig recognized that for potential competition 
to ensure zero profits sunk costs could not be too large. It turns out, 
however, that g there are even small sunk costs, potential competition may not 
be effective in ensuring either that profits go to zero or that eflcient outcomes 
obtain. 
There are two senses in which sunk costs may be small. They may be 
small relative to variable costs of production; or they may be relatively 
unsunk; that is, we customarily think of unrecoverable commitments of 
resources which are ‘used’ up in a day or a week as hardly being sunk: they 
are more in the nature of variable costs than sunk investment costs. 
It is easy to show that even if sunk costs are small in the first sense, 
‘The response that, under the stipulated conditions, a single multiproduct firm ought to, and 
presumably would, take over the entire industry, charging Ramsey prices. while at first seeming 
persuasive, was quickly found to be inadequate. See Sappington and Stiglitr 
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potential competition may be completely ineffective. Assume that there are a 
large number of identical firms, except that one has already entered the 
market. Each faces a constant returns to scale technology, once it invests E in 
sunk costs. They all believe that if there is more than one firm in the market, 
there will be Bertrand competition, so that price will fall to the marginal cost 
of production, c. In this case, the incumbent firm can charge the monopoly 
price; his behavior is completely unaffected by the presence of potential 
competitors. They will not enter, because they know that, were they to enter, 
they would fail to recover their E sunk costs. 
It is also possible to show that if sunk costs are small in the second sense 
(that is, they are not very sunk) then while potential competition may drive 
profits to zero, price remains at the monopoly level; potential competition is 
welfare decreasing, as all profits are dissipated in excessive capacity ex- 
penditures. Consider an industry in which all costs are sunk; an expenditure 
of F allows the firm to produce an unlimited quantity at a zero marginal 
cost for a period of T years. This industry is a natural monopolist. A 
monopolist would clearly charge the revenue maximizing price, replacing the 
machine every T periods. The threat of entry forces him to alter his behavior. 
He knows that were he to wait until his old machine wears out, it would pay 
some rival to enter at some prior date; though in the period during which 
both firms were in the market, if there were Bertrand competition, profits 
(indeed, price) would be zero, after his machine wears out, the original 
incumbent would not want to replace the machine. The entrant would then 
be in a position to make monopoly profits. There is a date, say p, prior to 
scrapping the old machine, such that if the incumbent constructs a new 
machine, it would not pay any rival to enter. Potential competition has 
simply resulted in excess capacity over the period (T- ‘?}; price remains at 
the monopoly level. Further, as T, the lifetime of the machine, becomes 
shorter (hence costs become less sunk), price remains at the monopoly price, 
while profits shrink to zero. 
These results are chosen to be dramatic, to show that potential compe- 
tition does not suf’fice. We have explored a variety of other models. A general 
principle emerges: the more competitiue x post competition (competition is 
after entry) the less effective is the market discipline provided by potential 
competition. If we had assumed, for instance, that the commodities produced 
by the different firms were imperfect substitutes, then potential competition 
would serve as a discipline device, provided sunk costs were not too large; 
the larger the elasticity of substitution between the two commodities, the 
smaller can sunk costs be, and the incumbent firm still maintain its 
monopoly position [Stiglitz (1988)]. 
5. Does more potential competition make competition more effective? 
In the analysis so far, it makes little difference whether there is one or 
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many potential competitors. There are some circumstances, however, where 
markets may be less competitive, the greater the number of potential 
competitors. The reason is simple: a firm’s incentive to undertake the risk of 
entering a market, to take away some of the profits of the incumbent firm 
will be diminished if it believes that if it is initially successful in doing so, 
other firms will simply enter the market, to take its profits away. 
But while potential competition may not provide an adequate discipline 
for the market, neither need the presence of several firms in the market. They 
may collude rather than compete. Until now, we have simply assumed that 
once entry occurs, Bertrand competition will break out. In fact, the principle 
of bygones-are-bygones applies to competitive strategies as well as to 
production decisions: once the entrant has entered, it may pay the incumbent 
firm to accommodate to that entry; in particular, the perfect equilibrium may 
entail collusion. This collusion may emerge even in finite period models. 
Consider, for instance, a three period model, in which if the firms do not 
cooperate, Bertrand competition breaks out. Accordingly, profits are zero. A 
firm that exits recovers an amount P>O. There will exist mixed strategies, in 
which each firm leaves with a given probability; the expected value of profits 
for these strategies is P. But joint profits are clearly higher if one firm leaves, 
and the other firm makes monopoly profits. There exists a perfect equilib- 
rium in which one firm promises to exit, provided in the preceding period(s), 
the other firm cooperates in charging the monopoly price and dividing the 
market in an appropriate way [Stiglitz (1988)]. 
This example as well as several of the others presented depends on exit 
and entry (sunk) costs.6 These are endogenous, chosen by the firms as part of 
their strategies, taking into account the consequences. 
6. Technical change and sunk costs 
Our interest in a careful examination of sunk costs was motivated by the 
understanding which these models might provide on the role of potential and 
actual competition on R&D, to which we now turn. 
Early analytic results of Arrow (1962) had suggested that in the presence 
of product competition, there would be too little expenditure on R&D, 
because if prices fell, the firm would not appropriate the consumer surplus; 
and if prices did not fall, the social gain would be less (again by the 
magnitude of the consumer surplus) than it would have been under a first 
best allocation. But R&D under monopoly was even less, because the 
monopolists’ output was smaller, and hence his gain from a marginal 
reduction in the cost of production was smaller. Arrow seemed to be directly 
challenging the Schumpeterian wisdom that monopoly was necessary for 
R&D to occur. 
6That part of entry costs which are not recovered upon exit can be thought of as sunk costs. 
E.E.R -M 
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The disparity in views was, however, more apparent than real. Arrow 
assumed a fully working patent system, which gave inventors a monopoly 
right over the invention; thus Arrow was completely unconcerned with the 
difficulties which arise in appropriating returns in competitive markets. 
Moreover, Arrow’s analysis was partial equilibrium. In a general equilib- 
rium model, in which all industries are characterized by some degree of 
monopoly, some industries may have a higher output than under compe- 
tition, some lower; there is no general presumption that R&D will be lower 
[Stiglitz (1985)]. Moreover, in his tirst best welfare comparisons, Arrow 
ignored the distortions associated with raising thb revenues required to finance 
R&D; the difference between market allocations (whether monopolistic or 
competitive) and the relevant second best welfare optimum may be much 
smaller than Arrow’s earlier analysis had suggested. 
Arrow had focused on the time-honoured polar models - monopoly and 
competition but most industrial sectors are oligopolistic, in which strategic 
competition - plays a central role; many of the insights gleaned from these 
polar cases do not carry over to this other arena, in which technological 
competition is often far more important than price competition. The 
relationship between R&D and market structure is complex. If, for instance, 
ex post competition in the product market is Bertrand, market structure 
makes little difference [Sah and Stiglitz (1987)]; in other cases, an increase in 
competition lowers the pace of R&D [Gilbert and Stiglitz (1979)J.’ In still 
other models, strategic considerations lead firms to accelerate their R&D, but 
then postpone the introduction of the innovation (holding what are known 
as sleeping patents) [Dasgupta, Gilbert and Stiglitz (1978)]. 
But the most serious objection to this whole approach is that market 
structure was taken to be exogenous: the non-convexities which are at the 
heart of technical change are essentially incompatible with the persistence of 
perfectly competitive market structures. Market structure needs to be treated 
as an endogenous variable; and the nature of competition is critically affected 
by the characteristics of technological change. It was this concern which 
motivated the research programme that we began together in the mid-70’s. 
Several results emerged from our early investigations of the relationship 
between potential competition and welfare [Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a, 
1980b)]. First, potential competition affected the behavior of incumbent 
firms. They were induced to engage in faster research, to pre-empt he entry 
of rivals. Secondly, the Schumpeterian picture of one firm being succeeded by 
another firm might not be accurate, as the incumbent firm seemed to have a 
decided advantage over potential entrants; we established the possibility of 
‘The intuition behind their result is simple. In their model, firms committed themselves to a 
level of research before they knew the research undertaken by others; equilibrium was character- 
ized by a mixed strategy. The more lirms in the market, the more duplication of research, and 
the slower the research programme had to be in order for the firms to break even. 
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the persisrence of monopoly [see also Salop (1979)].a Thirdly, potential 
competition neither drove profits to zero, nor, in general, ensured the 
attainment of (constrained) welfare optima. 
But even before we published our earlier results, we became concerned 
that our analysis had over-stated the potential role for potential competi- 
tion-q Potential competition may be relatively ineffective in the presence of 
even small sunk costs. Expenditures on R&D, and the process of improve- 
ment in production capabilities through learning by doing, fundamentally 
entail sunk costs. A firm that invested a small amount of sunk costs into a 
research programme could announce that it would meet any competition, 
winning the patent race. Not only could it make such an announcement, but 
the announcement would be credible. Entry would be deterred, and the 
incumbent would be able to carry on its research program essentially as if it 
were a monopolist. It can be shown that this strategy, which we referred to 
in our 1980(b) paper as s-pre-emption, is a perfect equilibrium. 
Similarly, when technical change is a result of production (learning by 
doing), if one firm has an E head start on others, the unique perfect 
equilibrium has it maintaining and extending that advantage, becoming the 
dominant firm.‘o 
7. Concluding remarks 
It would have been convenient if the scope of the Fundamental Theorem 
of Welfare Economics could have been expanded to cover modern industrial 
economies, to include natural monopolies and industries with technological 
change. Anti-trust could then focus its attention on government granted 
monopolies, and those maintained by other than economic forces (e.g., the 
Mafia). Our analysis suggests that the applicability of the presumption that 
market economies are efficient, that potential competition will serve to ensure 
that profits are driven to zero and that efficiency is maintained, is much 
more circumscribed than had previously been thought; and that indeed, there 
may even be a trade-off between the discipline that potential competition can 
provide and the degree of ex post actual competition. Our analysis, suggests 
*Gilbert and Newbery showed that even if the outcomes of R&D were stochastic, the 
incumbent would pre-empt entrants. Of course, if the incumbent does not know the research 
programmes undertaken by potential rivals, it may or may not pay for him to anticipate all of 
them. If he does not, then there may be a succession of monopolists, as Schumpeter had 
envisaged. See Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and Tirole. 
‘Reflected in a brief comment on p. 287 of Dasgupta and Stightz (1980b). 
“When no firm has any advantage, in addition to the asymmetric equilibrium, in which one 
Arm is a monopolist. there are (what may be mixed strategy) symmetric equilibrium; but these 
are clearly not robust to slight changes in the parameters of the problem. Thus we would 
contend that those models which have focused on the symmetric equilibrium have focused on 
the ‘wrong’ equilibrium. For a fuller discussion, see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988). 
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that even small barriers to entry can give rise to large degrees of monopoly 
power, and that natural monopolies and oligopolies, arising from the large 
sunk costs and non-convexities associated with learning by doing and R&D, 
are pervasive in modem industrial economies. But while Schumpeter may 
have been correct that some degree of competition is necessary for techno- 
logical progress, there is no assurance that the level of monopoly which 
emerges in the market will be that which is most conducive to progress, let 
alone to the appropriate division of the gains from technological progress 
between consumers and producers. 
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